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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of strategy messages emanating from both
top and middle/supervisory managers regarding five different aspects of strategy on strategic awareness
among boundary personnel.
Design/methodology/approach – The results come from a survey of bank tellers and customer service
representatives within a single large regional bank.
Findings – The findings support a differential main effect on strategic awareness among boundary
personnel depending on the source of messages, whether top management or middle management. More
interestingly, there appears to be an interaction effect between the two sources regarding which will be
the dominant information source for boundary personnel.
Research limitations/implications – The survey data were collected within a single banking institution
at one time point.
Practical implications – The results provide useful information concerning the efficacy of messages
concerning strategy from middle and top management in organizations.
Originality/value – The paper extends past research by investigating different levels of strategic
understanding within the firm across different levels and determining information dissemination strategies
for increasing the level of strategic awareness among boundary personnel.
Keywords United States of America, Banks, Customer service management, Management strategy,
Strategic awareness, Boundary personnel, Information dissemination
Paper type Research paper

While primary responsibility for strategic planning activities and strategy formulation are typically vested
with top management personnel, appropriate implementation of strategic activities is predicated on the
actions of lower-level organizational members, with particular emphasis placed on the tasks performed by
external boundary-spanners. Boundary-spanning roles are defined as positions which act as an interface
between the organization and its external customers (Buttle, 2004), and these organizational members are
responsible for managing the customers’ relationship with the organization. Modern marketing thought
holds that one of the more important functions in managing customer relationships is the customer contact
role (e.g. Liao and Mahesh, 2008). Since boundary personnel directly interact with the organization’s key
constituency, its customers, and provide an all important interface between the organization and its
market environment (e.g. Crosby et al., 1990; Donaldson and Hilmer, 1998), they are critical to the
successful implementation of strategy (Singh and Rhoads, 1991).
A key task for management is to effectively convey the organization’s strategic priorities to boundary
personnel. Considerable theory and some research suggests that when organizational leaders engage in the
sharing (information) of strategic intent, individuals’ awareness and group consensus regarding
organizational strategy will be enhanced (e.g. Bourgeois, 1980; Floyd and Wooldridge, 1992; Kets de
Vries, 1998; Lindman et al., 2001; Rapert et al., 2002; West and Schwenk, 1996). A clear and effective
dissemination of messages should foster a closer agreement between top executives’ view of strategy and
the views of lower-level organizational participants, notably boundary-spanners. A lack of understanding
or awareness among lower level organizational members about top executives’ view of strategy may
inhibit the implementation of the organization’s intended strategy at the organization’s boundary (Nobel,
1999).
Drawing upon sensegiving theory (Weick, 1995; Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991), we propose that the
strategy pursued by top management and the information-processing structure being used directly impact
the understanding, interpretation and subsequent activities of employees (Fiss and Zajac, 2006; Gioia and
Thomas, 1996). Consistent with the concepts of sensegiving theory (Weick, 1995; Gioia and Chittipeddi,
1991), we examine the effects of intraorganizational messages from top and middle managers and how
these messages interact in influencing the development of strategic awareness among boundary personnel
responsible for the implementation of strategy. To the extent that boundary personnel fail to receive
frequent and useful messages regarding the full scope and content of the strategies being pursued, a lack
of consistency between managerial intentions and employee actions could develop. As a result, effective
implementation of functional tasks could be placed at risk (Donaldson and Hilmer, 1998). We expect that
in the absence of clear messages across organizational levels (i.e. both top and middle management) as to
the content of the strategy to be pursued, significant gaps could arise between what top management plans
or intends as strategy and what is perceived or realized at the operational level.
Literature review
Sensegiving and sensemaking
Sensegiving and sensemaking and are two inter-related processes found in organizations that explain the
interpretive activities engaged in by top managers, middle managers, and employees (Dervin, 1998, 1999,
2003; Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991; Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001). In terms of the current study, both
sensegiving and sensemaking processes appear to be present in the focal phenomenon of building
strategic awareness among boundary spanners. Sensegiving is the process by which managers give or
assist in giving explanations for previously ambiguous phenomena (Gioia and Thomas, 1996). Research
on sensegiving tends to illustrate the way managers deliver sense-invoking information concerning an

ambiguous phenomenon rather than the process by which that information is translated into an
interpretation of the phenomenon (e.g. Fiss and Zajac, 2006).
In contrast, sensemaking is an ongoing, retrospective, interpretive process that helps individuals and
groups deal with ambiguity, adjust to their changing environment, and impose understanding on a
previously misunderstood event (Weick, 1995). Furthermore, sensemaking is viewed as both a theory for
understanding phenomenon (e.g. Weick, 1995) as well as a methodology for studying phenomenon (e.g.
Dervin, 1999). The previous definition applies to both the theory and the methodology. From a theoretical
perspective it provides an explanation for how individuals enact, select, and retain interpretations of
ambiguous events in the environment. From a methodological perspective, the same enactment, selection,
and retention process unfolds as the researcher attempts to understand the focal phenomenon.
For this study, we invoke the theoretical perspective and focus on the necessity of boundary spanners to
make sense of messages concerning strategy provided by both mid- and top-level managers. Although the
emphasis of much of sensegiving and sensemaking theories has been on events that occur in the
environment (Weick, 1995), it is believed that messages from management may also exert considerable
influence on the interpretation process of employees concerning strategy (Gioia and Thomas, 1996). An
organization’s strategy is typically represented by statements of intention that reflect management’s
perceptions of key issues as well as the way in which they share the goals, vision, and mission of the
organization across various important organizational functioning domains (Thomas and McDaniel, 1990).
Thus, managers’ messages are often intended to focus the attention of employees on particular strategic
issues and priorities (Gioia and Thomas, 1996) and to guide or “give sense” to lower-level participants’
interpretation of strategy (Thomas et al., 1994). In this sensegiving process, messages from top- and midlevel managers are intended to shape the level of strategic awareness and consensus possible among an
organization’s employees, including external boundary personnel. After “giving sense”, or rather
attempting to do so, through messages concerning strategy, it is incumbent upon employees in the
boundary spanning roles to engage in sensemaking in an attempt to develop an interpretation of the
espoused strategy that they can enact, select, and retain in their work processes.
Strategic awareness
Effective strategy implementation is predicated on the assumption that organizational members have a
clear, common understanding, or awareness, of the content of the organization’s current strategies
(Berthon et al., 1995/1996; George, 1990; Mintzberg and Waters, 1985). Following Hambrick (1981),
strategic awareness is defined as an individual-level construct and refers to the extent to which focal
individuals possess an awareness of the top management team’s strategic priorities. In contrast, the term
strategic consensus refers to the level of shared cognitions (Ensley and Pearce, 2001) or agreement within
a group about what strategy is or should be with investigations usually focused on members of an
organization’s top management team or TMT (cf. Dess, 1987; Wooldridge and Floyd, 1994; Nobel,
1999). (For a review of the literature on strategic consensus, see Kellermanns et al., 2005.) Thus, both the
meaning of the terms awareness and consensus, and the unit of analysis on which they operate are not
identical.
Consistent with the preceding, strategic awareness refers to the degree to which the perceptions of the
organization’s boundary-spanners (e.g. tellers and customer service representatives), with regard to
organizational strategies, are in agreement with those of senior management (e.g. the membership of the
focal organization’s strategic planning committee and CEO). When the perception of organizational
strategy is not in agreement with that of top management, then it is believed that the boundary-spanner is
less strategically aware.

A majority of research in the areas of strategic awareness and consensus has focused on an examination
of simple bivariate relationships between the extent of consensus among top managers as to the
organization’s strategy and/or goals, and its resulting performance (Kellermanns et al., 2005). In general,
research findings have tended to support expectations regarding the benefits of shared perspectives among
the organization’s leadership on the importance of competitive methods. The exact nature of these
relationships, however, has been found to vary according to the specific means/ends content of the
involved strategy dimensions. Conjunctively, the findings of previous research (e.g. Bourgeois, 1980;
Lindman et al., 2001) suggest two conclusions that have important implications for managers:
(1) that consensus on means is separate and distinct from consensus on ends (i.e. objectives) or other
attributes (e.g. environment); and
(2) that achieving a consensus on the organization’s set of competitive means (i.e. its set of tasks or
methods) should be a primary objective of management.
While the results of previous investigations provide substantial evidence supporting the benefits that
raising strategic awareness and within-group consensus have on performance, their contribution to the
objectives of the current study is rather limited. In fact, much of the research has viewed the concept of
strategic awareness too narrowly, focusing only on strategic awareness among the chief executive officer
(CEO) and members of the top management team (TMT) (Bourgeois, 1980; Lindman et al., 2001; West
and Schwenk, 1996). It has long been suggested that the examination of this topic should be extended
beyond the confines of the top management team to include the level of strategic awareness held by
operative-level or boundary personnel responsible for the implementation of strategy (Wooldridge and
Floyd, 1994). Furthermore, as previously noted, prior research has been largely focused on measuring the
extent of consensus between an organization’s members while neglecting to investigate possible
modalities for achieving the desired consensus.
Intraorganizational messages and strategic awareness
It has been argued that organizational “process” modalities, such as communication, provide an effective
means of transmitting ideas and direct thinking about the organization and its position in the marketplace
(Putnam and Pacanowsky, 1983; Fiss and Zajac, 2006). Internally, such communication facilitates the
awareness among employees about management’s desired sense of strategic direction. A review of the
organizational communication literature (cf. Cheney et al., 2004; Schultz and Wehmeier, 2010) generally
suggests that the ability of employees to develop a higher level of shared awareness of strategy may be
influenced by communication of information from managers and supervisory personnel.
A review of the literature on strategic awareness and consensus reveals two suggested avenues or
modalities through which managers can assure that the vision of strategy is being appropriately and
consistently perceived by personnel operating at the organization’s boundary (Menon et al., 1999). In the
first view, strategic awareness is achieved via the imposition of structural arrangements, such as the
formalization of rules and procedures, the centralization of authority, and the application of coordinative
mechanisms (St John and Rue, 1990). Managers are seen as structuring the organization in such a way as
to enhance strategic awareness and subsequent implementation of strategy.
The second view, one consistent with sensegiving theory (Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991), suggests that
“process” modalities, such as intraorganizational messages, offer an effective means of transmitting ideas
and directing thinking about the organization and its position in the marketplace (Harrison and Pelletier,
1997; Menon et al., 1999; Rapert et al., 2002). Managerial processes, particularly intraorganizational
messages, are a primary mechanism for the control and coordination of work efforts in organizations

(George, 1990). Such messages facilitate the transference of knowledge that instills a consciousness in
employees about the desired sense of strategic direction (Gioia and Thomas, 1996). Strategy information
sharing directed from the organization’s strategic decision-makers (i.e. the top management team) to its
boundary employees must be operating effectively if these latter personnel are to achieve the high quality
service delivery requisite for successful exchanges with external markets (customers). With the possible
exception of the study by Rapert et al. (2002) on the effects of frequency of contact between top
management and marketing executives on group consensus, to date, there has been a void of research
examining the effects of intraorganizational messages, on the development of strategic awareness among
boundary personnel.
The current study suggests that developing an awareness of strategy is contingent upon the effective
dissemination of strategy-specific information by involved managers (DiSanza, 1993; Frankwick et al.,
1994) resident at various managerial levels (Thomas et al., 1994) to boundary personnel. Consequently,
this study was devised to capture specific information about the role of perceived clarity of message
between top (TMT) and middle management (MM) personnel in enhancing the extent of strategic
awareness evident among boundary role personnel. To the extent the information conveys strategy
specific information and is of high clarity (i.e. frequency and usefulness of the message), strategic
awareness should be positively enhanced. Consistent with these notions we propose the following:
H1. An individual boundary spanner’s level of strategic awareness will be positively related to
the perceived clarity of managerial messages.
A second, and perhaps more intriguing, question concerns the relative impact of top management versus
middle management messages on the development of strategic awareness at an organization’s boundary.
Here, the concern is with which source of intraorganizational messages provides maximum impact on
strategic awareness at critical operational levels – top level executives who formulate the strategy and
then delegate its implementation, or the middle managers charged with the responsibility of overseeing its
implementation? The evidence regarding relative influence is inconclusive. Some evidence suggests that
top managers are uniquely positioned to use their position and expert power, gained partly through
effective information gathering and dissemination, to transmit strategic ideas and values (Kets de Vries,
1998; Skivington and Daft, 1991). Conversely, “functional managers, may rely more on reward, coercive,
and legitimate power within their hierarchical structures, leaving such communication skills less
developed” (Hrebiniak and Joyce, 1984, p. 179). These lines of reasoning would support the argument
that top management dissemination of information should enhance the extent to which a shared strategic
understanding is evident at the organization’s boundary more directly than would messages addressing
similar content from middle managers.
Others argue that interactions with middle and supervisory managers are more conducive to creating a
collective heart and mind among boundary personnel because of their ability to recognize strategic
problems and opportunities (Wooldridge and Floyd, 1990) and because they serve as “linking pins”
(Likert, 1961) whose position enables them to transmit information from top to bottom in the
organization. Furthermore, the control that middle managers exercise over feedback, goal setting, and
social cues (Tziner and Latham, 1989) leads one to expect that messages from front-line supervisors may
more directly influence strategic awareness among boundary personnel than top managers. Consistent
with sensegiving theory (e.g. Thomas et al., 1994), the organizational information process structures and
managers’ proximity in the organizational hierarchy, may lead middle managers to play a more pivotal
role than top managers in developing strategic awareness among boundary personnel. Cumulatively, the
preceding arguments suggest the following hypothesis:

H2. An individual boundary spanner’s degree of strategic awareness will be influenced to a
greater extent by the perceived clarity of messages from middle managers than those emanating
from top management.
Intuitively, multiple sources of messages may be complementary in increasing the overall effectiveness of
disseminating the strategic message (i.e. sensegiving), hence enhancing the recipients’ awareness of
various components of the organization’s strategy. However, the above arguments propose that strategic
awareness among an organization’s boundary personnel will be enhanced primarily as a result of
receiving high clarity messages from middle management. This line of reasoning suggests that attempts
by top managers to communicate their business models concurrently with middle managers may not
additively affect strategic awareness among boundary personnel. In effect, embracing two major
information sources (top management and middle management) in parallel could lead to suboptimal
understanding among target populations (e.g. boundary personnel). Sensegiving theory (e.g. Thomas et
al., 1994) suggests that these additional messages by top management may be redundant, confusing, or
misleading and may create ambiguity among employees (Weick, 1995) concerning their awareness of the
organization’s strategy in relation to their day-to-day behaviors. This would occur because the less
preferred sources’ lack of legitimacy may undercut the message, possibly cause information overload
which may confuse organizational participants, confront recipients with managerial and organizational
problems, and lead to increased information processing costs. That there might be a dysfunctional
interaction between sources of strategic information dissemination within the organization’s hierarchy
that lowers overall message efficacy at the organization’s boundary is the basis for the following
hypothesis:
H3. When the perceived clarity of messages from middle managers is low, rather than high, then
the perceived clarity of messages from top managers will more positively influence the strategic
awareness of boundary spanning personnel.
Methods
Data collection and measurement of variables
Study setting. The data presented here come from a field study of strategic information dissemination on
strategic awareness in a single, large (multi-billion dollar), regional, multi-location retail bank,
headquartered in a metropolitan city. Typically, retail banking institutions interact directly with
consumers, providing services such as savings and checking accounts and personal loans, at branch
locations for account holders. External boundary spanners are especially important in service
organizations, such as banks, which actively interact with and are heavily dependent on the consumer
market they serve. For example, in banks, external boundary spanners, such as tellers and customer
service representatives, are expected to develop and maintain knowledge of the company’s products and
services, its administrative policies and procedures, and to directly and continually interface with the
bank’s customers so as to support customer relationships and build customer loyalty (Schneider et al.,
1980).
Strategic awareness. Consistent with Kellermanns et al.(2005) recommendations for research on
awareness (and consensus), the items used to tap strategic awareness among the organization’s boundary
personnel was developed following a multi-step process. Initially, the investigators met with the CEO to
develop a rapport and further contacts with the bank. As a result of meeting with the CEO, the
investigators were invited to be observers at a corporate planning retreat intended to update and revise
corporate planning documents prepared by the “retail strategy committee”, which consisted of the bank’s
top 13 managers (including the CEO). In addition to observing the planning process, the investigators

interacted with individual members of the retail strategy committee. Based on these observations, the
investigators developed a draft survey instrument.
Following the recommendations of Hambrick (1984) for developing a strategic taxonomy to capture the
dimensions underlying an organization’s overall strategy, the draft survey instrument consisted of strategy
items identified by the authors from the literature (Davis et al., 2002; Dess and Davis, 1984). The wording
of these items was reviewed by several members of the retail strategy committee for appropriate phrasing
and terminology consistent with the industry context and bank use. The revised instrument was then sent
to a random sample of middle managers and boundary spanning personnel for their comments and
suggestions. The result of this face validity assessment process yielded a set of 29 items that was used to
assess strategic awareness. Having established face validity for the survey instrument, we then proceeded
to the data collection phase.
The main study included administering two waves of a questionnaire directed to top management
(identified by the CEO as consisting of himself and 12 members of the bank’s retail strategy committee),
middle management (all managers not represented by the CEO and the members of the retail strategy
committee), and a stratified (across geographic regions) random sample of boundary personnel. Overall, a
57 percent response rate (118 of 207) was obtained from tellers and customer service representatives
comprising the organization’s external boundary personnel.
The directions to each individual respondent were to “indicate the level of activity that you believe is
currently taking place” in the organization. Respondents used a seven-point Likert-type scale ranging
from “1 = rarely” to “7 = always”, to indicate his or her perception of the extent to which each of these 29
items were emphasized as part of the bank’s current strategy. A taxonomy consisting of five specific task
dimensionalities (eigenvalues .1) underlying the overall business strategy of the bank was established
using principal components factor analysis with an orthogonal rotation. Following Rummel (1967), a cutoff of 0.40 was used to retain 20 items as indicators of five individual factors or strategic dimensions. An
individual respondent’s score on each of the five dimensions of strategy was computed by summing the
raw scores for the items loading on its representative factor.
A review of the items comprising the content of each factor suggested their identification as critical
dimensions underlying the bank’s strategy of customer service, sales and promotion, products and
services, competitive environment, and administrative and coordinative activities. For the sake of brevity,
in the balance of the paper, these dimensions are referred to as “CUSTAWARE”, “SELLAWARE”,
“PRODAWARE”, “ENVIRAWARE”, and “ADMINAWARE”, respectively. Dimensions similar to those
identified here have been reported in the literature (e.g. Dess and Davis, 1984; Helms et al., 1997; Rapert
et al., 2002). Table I reports factor loadings for each of the five strategy scales developed from the factor
analysis, along with their Cronbach’s a values, which were well within acceptable ranges for exploratory
research (Nunnally and Bernstein, 1994).
Following the identification and development of the five strategic content dimensions, a second analytical
step was carried out in arriving at a measure for perceived strategic awareness among boundary
personnel. For each boundary person, strategic awareness was estimated by calculating the absolute value
of the difference between the aggregate score for the focal individual on each of the five strategic
dimensions and the mean score for the members of top management on that same strategic dimension.
The results of these calculations were five scores, one for each of the five strategic dimensions, and
reflective of the degree of strategic awareness on the part of the focal boundary person relative to that
particular dimension of strategic content. Previously, strategic awareness was defined as agreement
between an individual boundary personnel and the aggregate top management as to the content of specific

strategy dimensions. Hence the closer an individual boundary spanner’s score is to that of the TMT, the
more aware that individual is with the top managers of the organization concerning the organization’s
strategies.
Clarity of message content. The present study focused on the perceived clarity of messages about
organizational strategies as received by personnel at the organization’s boundary (e.g. tellers and
customer service representatives). A variety of methods have been suggested for the assessment of clarity
of message content (e.g. Spector, 1997). Here, we chose to focus on two indicants:
(1) frequency; and
(2) usefulness.
These and similar indicants have been used by communication researchers (e.g. Goldhaber and Rogers,
1979) to investigate the relationship among such components as the clarity of messages, marketing
strategy making, and firm performance (Menon et al., 1999). Logically, one could expect that, as taskspecific communication becomes more infrequent, boundary role personnel are more likely to view the
information provided as inadequate to obtain sufficient clarity for implementing complex strategy tasks.
Consequently, as frequency of communication is reduced, boundary role personnel’s awareness of
strategy would also be lowered. Similarly, the more communication is seen as conveying useful, taskrelated information, the more managers will be seen as providing clarity sufficient to support the
information needs of their employees. Consequently, providing useful information may be important in
increasing the boundary role personnel’s awareness of strategy.
Operationally, message clarity was measured using twenty items, divided according to the frequency and
usefulness of the messages as related to each of the five designated strategic tasks that the involved
boundary personnel had received from each management source (i.e. top management, middle
management) during the preceding two months. Message frequency was measured using a seven-point,
Likert-type scale reflecting the reported interval between messages received from top and middle
management regarding each of the five previously identified strategic task dimensions. Frequency scores
ranged from a high of 7 (daily messages from the focal source) to 1 (messages were rarely or almost
never received from that source).
The usefulness of messages received from each source (i.e. top management, middle management) for
each of the five strategic tasks, was similarly rated using a seven-point scale, ranging from “1 = not at all
useful”, to “7 = very useful”. Message clarity was then computed as a multiplicative index of each
individual boundary spanner’s scores on the message frequency and usefulness variables, as received
from each of two management levels (i.e. top management and middle management), for each of the five
strategy dimensions. The result was ten indicators of message clarity, one from each of the two
information sources – top managers and middle managers on each of the five strategic dimensions.
Analysis procedures
The research hypotheses posed in this study were assessed through the application of multiple regression
analysis, to include interaction between sources (i.e. top management and middle management) followed
by split group analysis. For each boundary role person, strategic awareness measures for each of the five
strategic task dimensions were regressed on the measure of message clarity from top management and
middle management and an interaction term representing the multiplicative relationship between these
two message sources. The occurrence of a significant interaction effect, in conjunction with its minimal
main effects, suggested that the message clarity from middle management plays an important moderating

role in the observed relationships. Following the recommendations of Howell et al. (1986), the subjects
were subsequently dichotomized into high and low groups and reanalyzed to further investigate this
relationship.
Results
Contained in Table II is a list of descriptive statistics (i.e. means and standard deviations) and zero-order
correlations between study variables. Top management message clarity was positively correlated to only
one component of strategy (ENVIRAWARE, r = 0.22, p < 0.05), whereas middle management message
clarity was positively related to three components of strategy (CUSTAWARE, ENVIRAWARE, and
ADMINAWARE, r = 0.22, 0.17, and 0.17, respectively, p < 0.05). The initial correlation analysis results
provide tentative support to H1, which stated that both top and middle management messages would be
positively related to strategic awareness. The pattern of correlations suggested that middle management
messages would be more strongly related to strategic awareness. This possibility was further examined
using regression analysis.
The results of the multiple regression analysis performed to examine the research hypotheses are
presented in Table III. The regression analyses provided a more refined interpretation of results than that
afforded by the correlation analyses. As is indicated, several significant main effects were observed,
partially supporting H1. In terms of the effects of top management messages, three significant and
positive main effects on strategic awareness were found for two of the five components of strategy:
SELLAWARE and ENVIRAWARE. Consistent with H1, these results would support the clarity of top
management messages as conducive to enhancing strategic awareness among boundary personnel
concerning selling and market research, respectively. In contrast, with the sole exception of
SELLAWARE, the results addressing the direct effects of middle management message clarity on
strategic awareness were not evident. A comparison of the main effects of communication from top- and
middle-management provides support for the arguments by authors such as Kets de Vries (1998) and
Skivington and Daft (1991) that dissemination of strategy-related messages from top management are a
productive modality for building strategic awareness among an organization’s personnel. Two
observations support this conclusion. First, two of the five observed top management driven beta
coefficients were found to be significant (p < 0.05), while only one such effect was found in the case of
the middle management driven effects. Secondly, of the four positive beta coefficients for top
management messages, all were stronger in comparison to those associated with the effects of middle
management messages. These results suggest that the influence of the perceived frequency and perceived
usefulness of messages emanating from top management predominate messages initiated from middle
management in affecting strategic awareness among boundary role personnel, offering partial support for
H2.
However, the finding of significant interaction terms suggests that the two sources do not act independent
of each other. Thus, these initial results should be approached with considerable caution. As shown in
Table III, significant interaction effects were observed in association with the two significant main
effects, as well as with administrative awareness.
The question of interaction effects between the two sources of messages (top and middle management)
was the subject of H3. In order to develop an improved interpretation of the nature of this interaction, we
performed a split-group analysis on the basis of a median split of the middle management message clarity
variable. In doing so, the intent was to examine the effects of the top management team’s message clarity
on strategic awareness among boundary personnel, while controlling for any possible confounding effects
of middle management message clarity. The results of this split group analysis are shown in Table IV.

The results shown in Table IV indicate that the clarity of messages existing between the boundary
personnel and middle management plays an important moderating role by neutralizing (Howell et al.,
1986) strategic awareness among the boundary personnel. Two pieces of evidence are important in
interpreting the results. First, results indicate that, in the presence of low-clarity of middle management
messages, messages from top management tend to positively affect strategic awareness among boundary
personnel on four of the five strategic activities, however, none of the effects rise to the level of statistical
significance used in the current study. Conversely, in the presence of high-clarity middle management
messages, messages from top management negatively affect boundary personnel strategic awareness on
all of the five strategic dimensions. These effects are significant (p < 0.05) for ENVIRAWARE and
ADMINAWARE. While this is suggestive of support for H3, the lack of statistical support at the required
level leads us to reject this hypothesis.
Discussion and conclusions
Focusing primarily on the perceived frequency and usefulness of messages from management to
boundary personnel (e.g. bank tellers and customer service representatives), we examined the extent to
which an organization’s vertical dissemination of information fosters strategic awareness. Our review of
prior theory and empirical research led us to hypothesize (H1) that the clarity of management’s message
about specific strategic activities would play an important role in influencing strategic awareness among
boundary personnel. Furthermore, it was hypothesized (H2) that employees’ awareness of strategy would
be more strongly affected by the clarity of messages emanating from middle managers (e.g., front-line
supervisors) than from top management. Finally, we hypothesized (H3) that the perceived clarity of
messages with middle managers would influence the ability of top management to disseminate messages
of strategic importance to affect strategic awareness among boundary role personnel. However, the results
only partially support the hypothesized relationships. Nevertheless, the relationships that were not
statistically supported may suggest that, whenever the boundary role personnel perceive poor clarity from
middle management, messages from top management can at least partially increase the level of strategic
awareness.
Among the most striking findings emerging from the study, and contrary to expectations (H2), was that
top management messages were considerably more effective than middle management messages in
developing strategic awareness among boundary personnel. In fact, middle management messages were
found to exert almost no affect on boundary personnel strategic awareness. While it is tempting to do so,
these results should not be viewed as supporting a single information source imperative. For example,
organizational support theories suggest that managers and supervisors (i.e. mid-level managers) are often
perceived as agents of the organization by employees (Rhoades and Eisenberger, 2002). As such, it is
possible that mid-level managers serve as a transfer mechanism for top management’s message
dissemination on strategy. Future research could investigate the degree to which mid-level managers act
as agents of the organization and provide indications of top management strategy.
Further, interpreting the relative impact of top versus middle management dissemination on strategic
awareness was clouded by the presence of interaction effects between the clarity of top and middle
management messages with the boundary personnel. We observed that while middle management
messages did not appear to directly influence strategic awareness among boundary personnel, it did
interact with top management messages, suggesting that middle management message dissemination may
be acting as a moderator variable (Howell et al., 1986). Indeed, the results of the split group analysis
provide evidence that the directionality and strength of the effects of top management messages on
strategy awareness among boundary personnel depend on the clarity of the messages these individuals
reported with middle management.

Two important insights were gained from the split-group analysis. The first was that when a focal
individual’s clarity of messages from his or her supervisors and middle managers is poor (i.e., low
clarity), then the top management team tends to play an important role in generating an increased
awareness of the organization’s intended strategy. Among these front-line personnel, the poor clarity of
their message dissemination relationship may become personally discouraging even becoming entangled
with the formal relationships they have with middle managers. It may be that utilizing less proximate
sources of strategic information (i.e., top management) allows these individuals to resolve ambiguity and
minimize certain social, psychological, or organizational costs of embarrassing themselves or
jeopardizing their performance and evaluation by appearing uninformed or incompetent to supervisors,
peers, and/or customers.
The second important implication emerging from the split group analysis concerns the situation in which
the clarity of messages between middle management and boundary personnel is good, at least according
to involved personnel’s assessment. Here, the results suggested that boundary personnel become less
receptive to messages from more organizationally distant sources (i.e. top management). Perhaps, as
messages from middle management to boundary personnel become more frequent and useful, the
receptivity of boundary personnel to messages along alternate pathways (e.g. from other organizational
sources) are being attenuated.
While it may be intuitively appealing to assume that involving more message dissemination sources
would produce an increased understanding of strategy content, our results indicate otherwise.
Paradoxically, when the clarity of messages with middle managers is high, it appears that acquiring more
information than they can effectively use may lead to an information saturation effect. Perhaps, having
obtained all necessary and relevant information from supervisors, the receiving of additional messages
from top management regarding strategy may result in information overload (O’Reilly, 1980).
Alternatively, when messages with middle management are perceived to be of a high clarity, messages
received from other sources (e.g. top management) may be subject to substantial bias or distortion,
particularly if they contain conflicting or disconfirming information compared to that received from more
immediate supervisory personnel. Hence the observed negative effects of top management message
dissemination. The net result for these individuals may be that in utilizing multiple sources of information
they could come to have a less accurate understanding of the organization’s strategic intent.
Further insights into the findings come from sensegiving and sensemaking theory (Fiss and Zajac, 2006;
Gioia and Thomas, 1996; Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991; Weick, 1995), which suggests that the same
internal stimulus (e.g. message dissemination) may be interpreted quite differently by managers within
the same organization. To the extent that middle managers serve as information conduits regarding
strategy content, the messages that boundary personnel receive from top and middle management could
differ in their content. Of course, the fact that middle managers are one step removed from the
formulation of the strategy could make the information they provide concerning strategy content less
accurate and complete than that provided by top management. Additionally, boundary personnel may
prefer information from middle management sources for reasons other than factors associated with their
expertise (e.g. accessibility, familiarity, trustworthiness, proximity). Indeed, there is abundant evidence
that individuals in organizations are noticeably biased in their procurement of information, often
preferring to rely on the most accessible sources while ignoring other, perhaps more accurate sources
(O’Reilly, 1982; Zimmermann et al., 1996).
In summary, the most important contribution of this research is the empirical test of the impact that
messages stemming from various levels of management (i.e., top, middle) have on the strategic awareness
of boundary personnel. The study augments

prior research on information seeking behavior among lower echelon employees that showed that they
typically rated front-line personnel and middle managers as their preferred and most informative sources
of role information (Ibarra, 1993). While some preference for messages stemming from middle managers
and supervisors may exist, the evidence provided here supports a differential effect for top managers in
creating and fostering strategic awareness at the organization’s boundary depending on the relationship
boundary personnel have with middle managers.
Implications for practice
Managers should understand that dissemination of strategy related information is an important
instrumentality in strategy implementation. Consistent with research on sensegiving and sensemaking
(Berthon et al., 1995/1996; George, 1990; Mintzberg and Waters, 1985), the clarity of received messages
links boundary spanners to those who formulate and oversee the strategy and enables the development of
a shared awareness among organizational members about strategic content and priorities. As the results
suggest, middle management acts as a moderator in the relationship between top management and
boundary personnel. Thus, it is incumbent on top management to be aware of the message clarity that
exists between middle management and boundary personnel. If the clarity is poor, then top management
should assume a greater role in communicating to boundary personnel as a route to creating greater
strategic awareness among boundary personnel. Under these conditions, the primary responsibility for
increasing boundary personnel strategic awareness shifts from middle management to the top
management, which must now ensure that strategic directions are distributed throughout the entire
organization, from top to bottom.
In contrast, when the clarity of messages between middle management and boundary personnel is good,
then middle managers become the primary information conduit for providing strategic information to
boundary personnel. This effect may compel a choice for top managers, whether to distribute information
directly or indirectly, via middle management, their strategic foci and priorities. In this situation, there is
reason to question the incremental benefit of top management endeavors to directly disseminate strategic
intent beyond the middle management level. Thus, at each respective level of management (i.e. at both
top and middle management) managers need to be aware of the effects that their overall clarity of
strategic messages with subordinates have in creating strategic awareness.
Implications for research and limitations
In this study we used a regression approach to examine the effects of strategic information dissemination
between top management and boundary personnel groups on the latter’s strategic awareness while
controlling for the state of messages between the boundary personnel and middle management. Although
we have illustrated the implications of messages for advancing strategic awareness, we have clearly not
exhausted the research possibilities. Further advancement will come via additional testing that is needed
to refine and extend our understanding of theoretical relationships among intended strategy, information
sources and processes, individual and organizational attributes and performance outcomes.
The current findings raise important questions not only about information dissemination and differential
source effects but also about those who differ in strategic awareness. An important limitation of this study
is its focus on individuals’ strategic awareness, that is, it did not directly assess strategic awareness at
other levels of analysis. Studies comparing strategic awareness across different organizational levels are
clearly needed. In addition, future work should endeavor to unravel the differential impact that messages
from various intraorganizational sources (e.g. top management, middle management, even peers) as well
as external sources (e.g. customers) might exert on individuals’ understanding of strategy within the
context of the organization. Perhaps, individuals’ relationships with particular information sources (e.g.

extent of trust) may make some individuals resistant to information emanating from certain sources within
the organization.
Another goal of future researchers might be to use a sample from multiple organizations. To assure
generalizability, it is important that the issues examined here be examined in different organizational
settings, as the results from this study are only generalizable to organizations which share similar
characteristics to those of the studied organization. In addition, differences in the structural properties of
organizations (e.g. centralization, formalization) also may affect message characteristics, reducing or
distorting the significance of a message. Arguably, the degree of influence of middle management
moderation would be greater in larger organizations with more levels of hierarchy and less in smaller
organizations. For instance, in the present study, boundary personnel (bank tellers and customer service
representatives) were observed to have a relatively small amount of daily personal contact with top
management. This may be an important reason for the ambiguous effects of top management messages on
strategic awareness. Perhaps, in situations where the nature of the work setting affords closer contact
between those at the periphery of the organization and its decision-making core, stronger effects for top
management messages might be observed.
One general limitation of the present study that future research could address is the generally small
sample size and the focus on a single organization. Although we performed a split group analysis and
power analyses suggested adequate power for such statistics, the sample was smaller than desirable for
adequately testing the effects of top management and middle management messages on strategic
awareness. This is partly due the focus on a single large organization. Future research should consider
gathering data from multiple organizations thus enhancing both sample size and overall generalizability.
Although the current findings provide interesting insights into the relationships shown, further research of
this nature could clarify the extent to which these issues play out in other sectors of industry and among
different roles within various organizations (e.g. boundary spanners versus line workers, etc.).
Another limitation is based on our use of communication as one-way, which is conducive for sensegiving,
but not sensemaking. Rather, the inference of sensemaking is based on the increased levels of strategic
awareness that were exhibited by individual boundary spanners who reported higher levels of perceived
clarity of communication from management personnel. Future researchers may wish to further study the
role of two-way communications in order to more effectively capture sensemaking from the boundary
personnel.
Finally, while research has demonstrated a relationship between performance and strategic awareness or
consensus among managers, particularly at the top management level (e.g. Bourgeois, 1980; Lindman et
al., 2001), additional research is needed to reveal the impact that increased or decreased messages with
and among boundary personnel has on individual and unit performance, perhaps extending to
relationships with customers and other organizational stakeholders. Hopefully, the results obtained here
may serve to stimulate research aimed at demonstrating how information dissemination and other
processes affect various performance outcomes.

Table I. Items, reliabilities, and factor loadings for the derived strategy scales
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